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Case Comment
GAY ALLIANCE TOWARD EQUALITY v.
VANCOUVER SUN
By W. W. BLACK*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the autumn of 1974, a new and more comprehensive Human Rights
Code was proclaimed in British Columbia.1 A short time later, the Gay
Alliance Toward Equality (GATE) submitted a classified advertisement to the
Vancouver Sun which read: "Subs to GAY TIDE, gay lib paper $1.00 for 6
issues. 2146 Yew Street, Vancouver." The newspaper refused to publish the
advertisement, and a complaint was filed which, after investigation, was re-
ferred to a Board of Inquiry. The Board found that the Code had been
violated,2 and the British Columbia Supreme Court upheld the decision on
the ground that it was based on findings of fact outside the scope of appeal.3
The British Columbia Court of Appeal overturned the Board's decision by
a two to one majority. 4 In May, 1979, the Supreme Court of Canada held
by a six to three majority that there had been no violation of the Code, but
it did so on grounds that were different from those of the Court of Appeal. 5
An advertising firm would be pleased by the results. As the case pro-
ceeded, it was extensively reported in the press and it has now been included
in several law reports. Seldom has an advertisement that was refused publica-
tion achieved wider exposure. The result has been less successful from the
point of view of human rights advocates. The fact that the Code was re-
stricted should not be a major disappointment, for the decision was on a
narrow ground that should have little effect on future cases. More significant-
ly, however, the case leaves unanswered many important questions concern-
ing the Human Rights Code.
O Copyright, 1979, W. W. Black.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. Professor
Black was a member of the British Columbia Human Rights Commission during the litiga-
tion of this case.
1 Human Rights Code of British Columbia, S.B.C. 1973 (2d sess.), c. 119.
2 Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun, unreported, 1975 (B.C. Bd. of
Inquiry), [hereinafter GATE].
3 Vancouver Sun v. Gay Alliance Toward Equality, unreported, Aug. 16, 1976
(B.C.S.C.), digested [1976] W.W.D. 160.
4 Re Vancouver Sun and Gay Alliance Toward Equality (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d)
487, [1977] 5 W.W.R. 198 (B.C.C.A.).
5 Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun (1979), 27 N.R. 117, [1979] 4
W.W.R. 118 (S.C.C.).
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In a sense, there are two GATE cases. The first formed the basis of the
complaint and concerns the question of whether the Human Rights Code
covers the refusal of a service to a gay rights organization. The Supreme
Court majority judgment touches only briefly on this question, but it was the
central issue before the Board of Inquiry and the lower courts and was dis-
cussed extensively in the dissenting Supreme Court judgments. The second is
a case about freedom of the press that provides incidental clues as to the
importance that the Supreme Court attaches to egalitarian rights and the pro-
tection of minorities. That is the case as it appears in the majority judgment
of the Court and in portions of Dickson J.'s dissenting judgment.
These two cases have little to do with one another, and I have found it
necessary to discuss them in separate sections. The section that follows dis-
cusses the scope of the Human Rights Code and its application to homo-
sexuals. The third section deals with the Court's approach to freedom of
speech, and the final section discusses the way in which the Court balanced the
competing rights.
II. DISCRIMINATION
Section 3 of the Human Rights Code provides, 6
(1) No person shall
(a) deny to any person or class of persons any accommodation, service, or
facility customarily available to the public; ...
unless reasonable cause exists for such denial or discrimination.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1),
(a) the race, religion, colour, ancestry or place of origin of any person or
class of persons shall not constitute reasonable cause; and
(b) the sex of any person shall not constitute reasonable cause [with certain
qualifications].
Canadian human rights statutes typically apply to public accommodations,
services and facilities, but only the British Columbia and Manitoba Acts use
the term "reasonable cause." The first issue in the case was whether a public
service had been denied. If so, it was necessary to interpret the words "reason-
able cause" and decide whether they applied to discrimination against homo-
sexuals.7 Appellate courts were forced to consider the proper scope of
appeal.
A. Public Services
The ratio decidendi of the case is that the newspaper did not deny a
service that it customarily offered the public when it refused to publish the
6 Human Rights Code of British Columbia, S.B.C. 1973 (2d sess.), c. 119, s. 3.
7 Neither the Gay Alliance nor the Human Rights Commission raised the argument
that the word "sex" comprehended discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
That contention had been rejected in a Saskatchewan case (Re Ed. of Gov. of the Univ.
of Sask. and Sask. Human Rights Comm'n (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 561, [1976] 3
W.W.R. 385 (Sask. Q.B.)), but a later Court of Appeal judgment criticized the case on
the ground that a writ of prohibition was inappropriate and the Human Rights Com-
mission should have been permitted to consider the issue (Re CIP Paper Products Ltd.
and Sask. Human Rights Comm'n (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 609 (Sask. C.A.)).
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advertisement. The Supreme Court started from the proposition that freedom
of the press is an important right in Canada and stated that the language of
the Code must be limited so as not to infringe upon that right. The newspaper
seemed to have conceded that newspaper advertising was a public service s
but the Court adopted a different approach. It did not consider whether
"advertising" or even "classified advertising" was a public service. Instead,
it said that the service offered was advertising space for such subject matter
as the newspaper might from time to time determine. It concluded that the
content of this particular advertisement was not within the service that the
newspaper offered.9 This reasoning would apply as well to other Canadian
statutes that use similar language.' 0
I believe that this reasoning creates a narrow exception that applies
specifically to publishers. Portions of the judgment at first seem to restrict the
application of section 3 with respect to other types of business as well, but
they lose significance when read in context. For example, at one point
Martland J. gave a short list of businesses covered by section 3, but he later
said that newspaper advertising, which is not on his list, is a public service,
albeit one that can be limited in terms of content." Therefore, it seems clear
that he did not intend his list to be comprehensive. In another passage, he
noted that the newspaper published daily a notice reserving the right to reject
any advertisement submitted for publication.12 Obviously, human rights sta-
tutes would be useless if businesses could exempt themselves simply by post-
ing a notice saying, "We do not serve women or Indians." The majority
judgment creates no such loophole, for Martland J. went on to find that the
refusal "was not based upon any personal characteristic of the person seeking
that advertisement, but upon the content of the advertisement itself."' 3 The
published reservation was relevant to the scope of the service, but it was not
found to permit discrimination with regard to whatever service was offered.
It is possible to think of examples in which businesses other than pub-
lishers might arguably justify refusal of a service in terms of the "content"
of the service offered, but I do not believe the reasoning of the Court in
GATE would apply. The Court expressly said that it interpreted the Code
8 GATE, supra note 5, at 129-30 (N.R.), 128 (W.W.R.).
9 Id. at 126-27 (N.R.), 125-26 (W.W.R.).
10 It is unclear whether the wording of the Ontario Code, which refers to a service
"in a place to which the public is customarily admitted," would apply to newspaper
advertising or whether a distinction would be drawn between the submission of an adver-
tisement in person at an office open to the public and a submission by telephone or mail.
See The Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, s. 2.
" GATE, supra note 5, at 126-27 (N.R.), 125-26 (W.W.R.). Cases have inter-
preted the term "service" broadly outside of the publishing field. See, e.g., Re Ins. Corp.
of B.C. and Heerspink (1978), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 520, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 702 (B.C.C.A.)
(policies of insurance); and Race Rels. Bd. v. Applin, [1975] A.C. 259, [1974] 2 W.L.R.
541, [1974] 2 All E.R. 73 (H.L.) (fostering of children); cf. A.G. Can. v. Cumming,
not yet reported, July 31, 1979 (F.C.T.D.) (assessment of taxation by Department of
National Revenue).
12 GATE, supra note 5, at 127 (N.R.), 125 (W.W.R.).
13 Id. at 127 (N.R.), 126 (W.W.R.). [Emphasis added.]
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as it did for the purpose of protecting freedom of the press, and it seems clear
that the word "content" was used to refer only to forms of communication.
B. Reasonable Cause
Only in British Columbia have boards of inquiry had to consider the
meaning of the term "reasonable cause," but its interpretation raises policy
issues of more general relevance. At common law, innkeepers and common
carriers were prohibited from denying their accommodation or services without
reasonable cause,14 and the purpose of section 3 was to extend a similar obliga-
tion to other businesses.' 5 Though the majority decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada decides the case on another ground, the words "reasonable cause"
were the focus of discussion before the Board and the lower courts, and in the
dissenting Supreme Court judgments.
Though Martland J. does not expressly discuss the words "reasonable
cause," he does rely on the fact that the refusal was based on the content of
the advertisement rather than a personal characteristic of the individual who
submitted it. However, that passage should not be read as implying that the
words "reasonable cause" are limited to denials based on a personal charac-
teristic. Such a limitation would make it easy to circumvent the Code and
was rightly rejected by the dissenting judges. One could exclude blind people,
for example, by forbidding the entry of guide dogs or even the use of white
canes, for even the most unreasonable prohibition would fall outside the
Code if it were not in terms of a personal characteristic. Women and religious
minorities could often be excluded by means of dress requirements. Indeed,
with a little ingenuity, almost any group could be excluded on some basis
other than a personal characteristic. 16 Martland J.'s point was that the content
of the advertisement placed it outside the scope of the service that the news-
paper offered the public. He clearly had not addressed himself to the issue of
reasonable cause, and his judgment should not be interpreted as inadvertently
placing an unjustifiable limitation on those words.' 7
14 See Molot, The Duty of Business to Serve the Public: Analogy to the Innkeeper's
Obligation (1968), 46 Can. B. Rev. 612.
'5 B.C. Leg. Assembly Deb. Nov. 6, 1973, at 1353.
16 Also, it is far from clear what constitutes a "personal characteristic." The term
would seem clearly to exclude such matters as manner of dress and to include matters
such as race and sex, but the status of other factors is less clear. The phrase could be
interpreted as applying only to unalterable physical characteristics. But it might also be
applied to temporary physical conditions such as pregnancy. Factors not related to
physical condition such as religion or marital status (both of which are explicitly in-
cluded in the Human Rights Code) might or might not be considered personal charac-
teristics. Martland J.'s failure to define the term is further evidence that his point was
that a newspaper could determine its content and his reference to personal characteristics
was merely by way of contrast.
17 It would be even less justifiable to limit the words "reasonable cause" to the
grounds of discrimination set out in subsection (2) of section 3. That interpretation
ignores the difference between the wording of section 3 and that of sections 4 and 5,
both of which omit any reference to reasonable cause and do contain a comprehensive
list of prohibited grounds. The interpretation would also render subsection (1) of no
effect. It is not surprising, then, that it has been rejected in other cases and was not even
argued in the GATE case. See dictum in Re Burns and UPPT Local 170 (1978), 82
D.L.R. (3d) 488, [1978] 2 W.W.R. 22 (B.C.S.C.); cf. Heerspink, supra note 11.
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Laskin C.J.C. may have adopted a definition of reasonable cause that
goes too far in the other direction. Portions of his judgment could be con-
strued as suggesting that these words prohibit any form of unreasonable con-
duct, whether or not it relates to discrimination.' As so interpreted, section
3 would be violated if a bartender concluded hastily and unreasonably, but
without any bias, that a customer was drunk, and an employer would violate
section 8 by failing to hire an applicant because the application had negli-
gently been misplaced. These examples illustrate that, as so interpreted, the
Human Rights Code would usurp many areas of law including much of the
field of labour relations. It seems clear that the legislature did not intend such
a result and that, in the context of a human rights statute, the words "reason-
able cause" should be limited to conduct in some way related to unequal
treatment of an identifiable group. 19 Chief Justice Laskin's statements should
be read together with the facts of the case which showed a clear refusal to such
a group.
It is possible to define the phrase "reasonable cause" in a way that avoids
the problems arising from both judgments. The solution is to interpret the
prohibition as applying to conduct that has a discriminatory effect upon an
identifiable group. By making the effect of the conduct the operative factor,
the Code is broad enough to prohibit practices not framed in terms of a per-
sonal characteristic and neutral on their face if they operate to exclude a
group. On the other hand, since an effect on a group must be proved, the
prohibition is not extended to every type of unreasonable conduct. Thus, an
employer who unreasonably required applicants for a manual labour position
to have completed twelfth grade would violate the Code if it could be shown
that the requirement had the effect of excluding a disproportionate number
of native people. But an employer who required all of his or her employees
to work in unreasonably dangerous conditions would not be subject to the
Code.20
Limiting the application of the Code to conduct that has a discrimina-
tory effect is consistent with the purposes of human rights legislation. It is
also consistent with other decided cases. The Ontario Human Rights Code,
which prohibits only specified forms of discrimination, has been interpreted
18 GATE, supra note 5, at 135-36 (N.R.), 133 (W.W.R.).
10 An early Board of Inquiry decision supported the broader interpretation but was
subsequently rejected by other Boards and by the courts. See Heerspink, supra note 11,
at 525 (D.L.R.), 707-08 (W.W.R.).
20 The primary disadvantage of this interpretation is the necessity of defining what
constitutes a group. In this context, it makes no sense to apply the word to every collec-
tion of people who happen for the moment to share a common characteristic. People
who own blue coats or whose beds face north would not commonly be called a group.
At the other extreme, I believe, it would be contrary to common usage to limit the
word to persons who share characteristics about which they have no choice. Such a
definition would exclude collections of people who share a common religion, citizenship
or political belief, categories expressly recognized in human rights statutes. Perhaps we
can do no more than ask whether the average person would commonly think of a
particular collection of individuals as a group. That approach is less exact than would
be ideal, but it at least places some limitation on the words "reasonable cause" and at
the same time covers all of the grounds of discrimination set out in subsection (2) of
section 3.
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as prohibiting an employer from requiring a uniform that violates the reli-
gious beliefs of a potential employee, even though that requirement does not
relate to a personal characteristic and the effect on the group was unin-
tended.21 It would be strange if the more general phrase "reasonable cause"
did not cover such facts.
The first step in my proposed approach is to find a discriminatory effect,
but there is also a second step. It must be determined whether, despite the
discriminatory effect, the conduct is nevertheless reasonable. For example, an
employer can demand qualifications that are clearly necessary for the per-
formance of the work whether or not they have the effect of excluding certain
groups.22 Unfortunately, not all cases are that obvious, and the decisions
handed down in the GATE case reveal important disagreements about the
factors that are relevant in deciding the reasonableness of the conduct.
The Board of Inquiry found that the denial was due to a bias against
homosexuals rather than a desire to protect standards of decency and good
taste, as had been contended. It went on, however, to consider the issue of
public decency. It found that neither the advertisement nor the publication
Gay Tide was in any way indecent, lascivious or improper, nor did the pub-
lication recruit heterosexuals to a homosexual lifestyle or advocate illegal
conduct. It found that the subject of homosexuality did not, of itself, justify
the refusal. The Board did not decide whether loss of business would consti-
tute reasonable cause, because it found no evidence that the advertisement
would cause such a loss. The Board concluded that the denial had been
unreasonable. 23
In the Court of Appeal, Branca J.A. stated that the Board had erred in
failing to apply an objective test, citing its finding of personal bias. However,
he added:
The Board did not find that the various individuals within the management of the
appellant newspaper were impelled towards their bias because of b~se views or
by spite, malice or in bad faith or indeed, in circumstances other than good faith.
In the absence of a finding of a bias based on bad faith, how can it be justly said
that the bias held by such individuals is one that might not have been reasonable
and honestly entertained by them? This was never determined by the Board. If the
bias was honestly entertained, then there was not an unreasonable bias.
To go one step further, if the policy was motivated by an honest bias, why
then is the policy unreasonable? 24
21 Singh v. Security and Investigation Services, unreported, 1977 (Ont. Bd. of In-
quiry). See also, Colfer v. Ottawa Bd. of Comm'rs of Police, unreported, 1979 (Ont.
Bd. of Inquiry); Foster v. B.C. Forest Products Ltd., unreported, 1979, (B.C. Bd. of
Inquiry), aff'd. B.C.S.C., unreported, October 9, 1979; and Robertson v. Metropolitan
Investigation Security (Canada) Ltd., unreported, 1979, (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry).
22 This discussion concerns the determination of reasonable cause when the alleged
ground of discrimination is not one of the grounds explicitly named in the Code. A
somewhat different approach would apply if one of the named grounds of discrimination
were alleged.
23 GATE, supra note 2.
24 GATE, supra note 4, at 495 (D.L.R.), 209 (W.W.R.).
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Mr. Justice Robertson of the Court of Appeal agreed that the Board had
erred in failing to apply an objective test. Outlining his view of the correct
approach, he said:
It is in my view that the words in s. 3(1) of the Code, "unless reasonable cause
exists" require the application of an objective test: Does such a cause exist? It is
wrong in law to substitute for this the subjective test that the Board applied: What
motivated the person who denied or discriminated and was this motivation reason-
able cause for the denial or discrimination? To put it another way: If reasonable
cause does in fact exist, the person discriminated against cannot claim the benefit
of s. 3, even though the other person did not know of the existence of the cause;
conversely, if reasonable cause does not in fact exist, the other person cannot
justify his act of discrimination by a genuine belief that a reasonable cause did
exist.25
He then found that the Board had erred not only in looking at the motiva-
tion of officers of the newspaper, but also in failing to consider the possibility
that the newspaper would lose business by publishing an advertisement that
offended some of its subscribers.26
The majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada does not dis-
cuss these points. The dissenting judges conclude that the issue is a question
of fact and outside the scope of appeal; thus, they do not discuss in any detail
the standards to be applied. They do, however, reject the defence of "honest
bias.",
27
The judgments of Branca J.A. and Robertson J.A. contain a number of
errors that would seriously undermine the Human Rights Code. Their use of
the subjective/objective dichotomy compounds the problem as those words
have several meanings and could be applied in various senses to different
aspects of the case. Though Robertson J.A. expressed "substantial agreement"
with the quoted portion of Branca J.A.'s judgment, the tests formulated by
the two judges seem mutually inconsistent, and the test of Branca J.A. was
expressly rejected by the three Supreme Court judges who considered it.28
Therefore, neither Court of Appeal judgment is binding. Nevertheless, the
absence of any clear definition of "reasonable cause" by the Supreme Court
makes it necessary to examine those judgments.
If I am right that the words "reasonable cause" apply only to conduct
with a discriminatory effect, some account must be taken of the reasons moti-
vating the person who denied the service. Discrimination can result from a
conscious desire to exclude a group or from the application of a policy that
unintentionally affects a group adversely. In the former case, it is obvious
that the thought processes of the alleged discriminator are relevant to the
25 GATE, Id. at 496 (D.L.R.), 209-10 (W.W.R.).
20 Id. at 496 (D.L.R.), 210 (W.W.R.). Robertson J.A.'s statement that the Board
had not considered the issue resulted from his determination that the Court could ex-
amine only the stated case and could not refer to the decision of the Board. (Op. cit.
at 497 (D.L.R.), 211 (W.W.R.)). That point is not discussed in the Supreme Court
of Canada judgments.
27 GATE, supra note 5, at 133, 152 (N.R.), 130-31, 149 (W.W.R.).
28 Id.
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issue. But they are also relevant in the latter instance, for we can only decide
whether other members of the group would have been similarly affected if we
know the reason for the exclusion. It is not enough merely to determine that
there was no good reason for an exclusion of an individual, for that finding
does not reveal whether or not the exclusion related to group membership. 29
By forbidding consideration of the reason for the refusal of the service,
Robertson J.A., like Laskin C.J.C. if broadly interpreted, would seem to
extend the Human Rights Code to prohibit all unreasonable conduct, whether
or not it has a discriminatory effect.
Mr. Justice Robertson's test would in another respect unduly narrow the
Code. Apparently, he would find that a denial of a public service (or employ-
ment) explicitly based on a person's race would not violate the Code if, un-
beknownst to the discriminator, some other reason were later shown to have
existed that would have justified the refusal. That result is untenable. The
existence of an alternative ground might be relevant to the issue of damages,
but it should not provide a defence, as human rights statutes are designed to
prevent future discrimination against other individuals as well as to provide
a private remedy to the complainant.3 0 Moreover, human rights inquiries
could become inquisitions into the entire life of a complainant if factors
unknown to the alleged violator at the time of the incident were a defence.
If, then, it is proper to examine the reasons motivating the denial of a
service, is Branca l.A. correct in saying that there is no violation if a person
honestly believes that a denial is justified? In his words, should an "honest
bias" provide a defence? If so, the test of reasonable cause would be subjec-
tive in the sense that the standard by which the conduct was to be judged
would be set in each case by reference to the personal beliefs of the individual
who had denied the service.
Chief Justice Laskin's somewhat sarcastic tone in rejecting this interpre-
tation was appropriate. The law almost never allows a person to determine
the standards by which he or she is to be judged. In addition, human rights
legislation would be rendered largely ineffective by the recognition of a de-
fence of "honest bias." Discrimination is seldom motivated simply by spite.
More often people feel that their antipathy to a group is justified either by the
29 It would be possible to define discrimination purely in terms of statistical proof
that a disproportionate number of members of the group had, over a period of time,
been excluded. However, that definition is inconsistent with the scheme of Canadian
human rights legislation with its emphasis on individual complaints requiring a deter-
mination as to whether discrimination took place on a particular occasion. Moreover,
even equal employment opportunity programmes, which are not based on individual
complaints, do not penalize the disproportionate exclusion of a group if it is unrelated
to any practice or policy of the business to which the programme applies. See U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 1 Affirmative Action and Equal Employment
(Washington: n. pub., 1974) at 4-7.
3OHuman Rights Code of British Columbia, S.B.C. 1973 (2d sess.), c. 119, s. 17
requires a board to order that the contravention cease and the offender refrain from
committing the same or a similar contravention. An award for special or aggravated
damages is optional.
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fact that the group is unworthy in some way-that it is "lazy" or "dishonest,"
for example-or by reference to some principle such as national identity or
the need to avoid social unrest by maintaining a homogeneous society. The
invalidity of these views should not blind us to the fact that bigots almost
ahvays honestly, often passionately, believe in their own rationalizations. But
human rights legislation is not enacted simply to ensure that people live up
to their personal convictions. Its purpose is to compensate the victims of dis-
crimination and, more idealistically, to change the attitudes that cause the
harm. Obviously, neither of these aims can be achieved if the very existence
of a deeply felt prejudice provides a defence.
For similar reasons, Robertson J.A. is wrong in suggesting that the fear
that a business would lose other customers by serving a minority group should
constitute reasonable cause. That defence would in effect determine reason-
able cause on the basis of the prevailing attitudes of prejudiced people in the
immediate vicinity. The strength of the defence would be proportional to
the prevalence of the bias, and human rights legislation would be ineffective
in precisely those communities in which it was most needed. Moreover, the
claim that business will be lost by serving a minority is almost always made
without supporting evidence.31
Finally, the question is not whether we approve of a group, but whether
we think that its members have a right to equal treatment. It seems trite to
point out the distinction between support of a particular political party, for
example, and a belief that it should be allowed to participate in elections. Mr.
Justice Branca seems to miss that distinction in stating that the fact that many
people object to homosexuality on moral or religious grounds shows that dis-
crimination against homosexuals is reasonable.3 2 The same is true of com-
munism, divorce or abortion, but few would argue that communists, divorcees,
and supporters of abortion should be denied ordinary public services. Our
test of reasonable cause should be "objective" in the sense that we rise above
our emotional sympathy or animosity toward a particular group and try to
decide the issue on the basis of more generalized criteria.
C. Sexual Orientation
Since the majority of the Supreme Court decided the case on the ground
that no public service had been denied, it did not consider the applicability
of the Code to discrimination against homosexuals. The dissenting judges
concluded that the Board of Inquiry had acted properly in finding that the
Code had been violated. That conclusion is supported by the legislative his-
tory of the Code,13 and is consistent with the approach that I have suggested
in interpreting section 3.
31 Cf. GATE, supra note 5, at 134(N.R.), 131-32 (W.W.R.). Human Rights tri-
bunals have consistently rejected this "discrimination by proxy" defence. See, e.g., Hayes
v. Central Hydraulic Mfg. Co., unreported, 1973 (Alta. Bd. of Inquiry); and Singh,
supra note 21.
32 GATE, supra note 4, at 494 (D.L.R.), 208 (W.W.R.).
33 B.C. Leg. Assembly Deb. Nov. 5, 1973, at 1260, 1265; Nov. 6, 1973, at 1355.
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A broader question is whether it is wise to include sexual orientation
within the grounds of discrimination prohibited by human rights legislation.
That question is of some importance outside British Columbia. The Quebec
statute now prohibits discrimination on that ground,3 4 and the Ontario Human
Rights Commission has recommended that it be included in the Ontario Code.8 5
The Board of Inquiry in GATE faced that question in interpreting the words
"reasonable cause" and said:
On one side of the dilemma is the argument that society must strive to define and
protect a strong acceptable standard of public decency. Such a standard, while
flexible enough to enable it to respond to the ever changing attitudes displayed
by the constituent elements of our community, must, at the same time, have suffi-
cient rigidity and strength to ensure the protection of those basic concepts of
decency and propriety that are fundamental to a civilized way of life.
On the other side of the dilemma is the assertion, exemplified by the Code,
that society must actively seek to protect those portions of its citizenry, who are
different in some way and who thus attract to themselves acts of discrimination
that are fostered by pre-conceived and unreasonable judgments or opinions marked
by suspicion, fear, intolerance or hatred.
The answer to the dilemma lies in the willingness of a mature society to
recognize and to accept that people are different and to tolerate those differences.
By recognizing that homosexuals exist, society is simply acknowledging that there
are, in fact, people who do have, what is for them at least, a quite natural ability
to relate sexually and emotionally to others of the same sex. By accepting this fact
society is having regard to the preponderance of evidence and professional opinion
that exists to the effect that homosexuality is not an illness or a mental disorder
and that it is a predominant and permanent characteristic of a significant portion
of our population-perhaps as much as 10% thereof.
Surely now in the 1970's our fear of the different or the unusual must be over.
come by our confidence in the strength of our social fabric taken as a whole.
Acceptance of people for what they are does not require that society at the
same time encourage or promote homosexuality or convert those who are not
naturally so inclined. To recognize and respect the beliefs or practices of others
without necessarily agreeing or sympathizing with them is to show the sort of
tolerance that is the mark of a truly civilized and mature society.36
The protection of homosexuals is consistent with the primary aim of
human rights legislation which is to require that people be judged on the basis
of individual merit rather than a stereotype assumed to be characteristic of
all members of a group to which they belong. Certainly, such a stereotype
exists concerning homosexual men and women. It seems, then, that homo-
sexuals are subject to the kind of discrimination that human rights statutes
are designed to prevent. Also, there seems to be no evidence that businesses
are harmed by serving homosexuals. 37 However, many claims have been
made about this controversial subject, and they cannot all be canvassed in
this comment.
34 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, S.Q. 1975, c. 6, s. 10, as am. by S.Q.
1977, c. 6, s. 1.
35 Ont. Human Rights Comm'n, Life Together: A Report on Human Rights in
Ontario (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1977) at 81-82.
36 GATE, supra note 2, at 26-28.
37 It may be of some interest that the Vancouver Sun has reversed its policy and
now accepts such advertisements, apparently without adverse effect.
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D. Scope of Appeal
The Human Rights Code provides for an appeal on questions of law or
questions of fact going to jurisdiction.3 8 It seems clear that a Board of In-
quiry's jurisdiction does not depend upon whether reasonable cause did or
did not exist. Therefore, the scope of appeal is affected greatly by whether a
Board's determinations about reasonable cause are characterized as questions
of law or fact. That characterization involves a policy determination as to
who should decide the issue. Even if characterized as a finding of fact, how-
ever, the tribunal is not given sole responsibility for the issue. The finding
must be made using proper criteria, and a tribunal can be assigned a greater
or lesser degree of responsibility for an issue by making those criteria general
or detailed.39
I believe that Boards of Inquiry should be assigned primary responsibility
for the issue of reasonable cause and that the legal standards imposed on
them should be kept fairly general. The record of the courts in enforcing anti-
discrimination provisions is discouraging. Common law provisions have been
interpreted in an extremely restrictive fashion.40 The statutes that were en-
acted during and after World War II relied on judicial enforcement and
proved to be almost completely ineffective. 41 They were replaced by new
legislation, a primary purpose of which was to transfer responsibility for
enforcement from the courts to administrative tribunals.4 It would be un-
fortunate if this legislative objective were thwarted by the overzealous use of
appellate powers.
The administrative approach reflected in human rights legislation makes
good sense. Anti-discrimination law is a developing field that raises questions
of policy with which the courts have little experience. Specialized adminis-
trative tribunals can develop expertise in the area. In addition, women and
racial minorities are woefully under-represented in the judiciary, and the use
of administrative tribunals makes possible a more equitable representation
of these groups.
III. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada treats the case
as primarily concerning freedom of the press. Martland J. starts from the
proposition that this freedom is an important right in Canada, citing the
3
8 Human Rights Code of British Columbia, S.B.C. 1973 (2d sess.), c. 119, s. 18.
39 Davis, Administrative Law Text (3d ed. St. Paul: West, 1972) at 545-47; cf.
Fleming, The Law of Torts (5th ed. Sydney: Law Book Co., 1977) at 134-35.
40 See Hunter, Human Rights Legislation in Canada: Its Origin, Development and
Interpretation (1976), 15 W. Ont. L. Rev. 21 at 23-24.
41 See, e.g., R. v. McKay (1955), 113 C.C.C. 56 (Ont. Cty. Ct.); and R. v. Emerson
(1955), 113 C.C.C. 69 (Ont. Cty. Ct.); cf. Tarnopolsky, The Iron Hand in the Velvet
Glove: Administration and Enforcement of Human Rights Legislation in Canada (1968),
46 Can. B. Rev. 565 at 568-69.
42 Tarnopolsky, id. at 569-71.
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Alberta Press cases8 and a judgment of the United States Supreme Court.44
In characterizing the nature of the dispute, he says, "The issue which arises in
this appeal is as to whether s. 3 of the Act is to be construed as purporting
to limit that freedom. '45 He concludes that a newspaper can determine the
scope of the advertising service that it offers and that section 3 of the Human
Rights Code does not apply to a refusal based on the content of an advertise-
ment. That limitation is not apparent from any literal reading of the section.
The majority seems to have invoked the rule of construction that legislation
should be construed narrowly if a broader construction would infringe upon a
fundamental right. That principle has been long established, if intermittently
applied. For example, in Brownridge v. The Queen40 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the breathalyzer provisions of the Criminal Code should
be construed to permit a person to consult counsel before being required to
take the test. McKay v. The Queen47 concerned the right of a property owner
to display a candidate's sign during a federal election. The Supreme Court
created an exception allowing such signs though none was apparent in the
wording of the by-law. These cases, particularly the McKay case, suggest that
strained interpretations of a statute are permissible to preserve a fundamental
right.
In his dissenting judgment, Chief Justice Laskin criticized the distinction
made between the content of an advertisement and the personal characteristic
of a customer. He said:
Counsel for the Vancouver Sun would have it that although it could not dis-
criminate against a person on the ground that he had only one eye-that would
be discrimination related to an attribute of the person-it could refuse an adver-
tisement soliciting subscriptions to a periodical for the blind because of newspaper
policy against accepting such an advertisement.
He called this argument "a desperate one."'48 Mr. Justice Dickson also re-
jected this argument. He accepted the premise that freedom of the press is an
important right and that newspapers have a unique and important place in
western society. However, he found that the proper distinction was between
the editorial and news content of a paper and advertising space. He found
that the Human Rights Code gave members of the public a right of access to
publish their views in paid advertisements unless there were reasonable
grounds to deny that right, but that newspapers had full control over other
portions of the paper.49
The importance that the majority places on freedom of expression is in
sharp contrast to other recent decisions of the Supreme Court. In Nova Scotia
48 Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100, [1938] 2 D.L.R. 81, [herein-
after Alberta Press].
44 Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S. Ct. 2831
(1974).
45 GATE, supra note 5, at 126 (N.R.), 124 (W.W.R.).
46 [1972] S.C.R. 926,28 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 417.
47 [1965] S.C.R. 798, 53 D.L.R. (2d) 532.
48 GATE, supra note 5, at 135-36 (N.R.), 133 (W.W.R.).
49 Id. at 148-49 (N.R.), 145-46 (W.W.R.).
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Board of Censors v. McNeil,60 the Court upheld the constitutional power of
the Province to censor films. The Court cited the general power of the prov-
inces to regulate intra-provincial business and held that movie censorship
came within these powers. The Court has also upheld the power of the prov-
inces to regulate the content of advertising. In A.G. Quebec v. Kellogg's Co.
of Canada,51 the Court upheld a Quebec regulation prohibiting the publica-
tion of cartoon advertising intended for children. The specific issue before the
Court was whether this provision applied to television advertising. However,
the Court referred to provincial regulation of other advertising and said,
"[t]he Provincial power to enact such legislation under s. 92(13) and (16),
if not under s. 93, of The British North America Act, 1867, would appear
to be clear."152 The Court then distinguished cases holding that the power to
regulate television transmission was ultra vires the provinces and added,
"That power is not in issue in the present case. What is in issue here is the
power of a provincial legislature to regulate and control the conduct of a
commercial enterprise [Kellogg's] in respect of its business activities within
the province."' '
Of course, both the McNeil and Kellogg's cases concerned constitutional
challenges to a statute rather than a question of statutory construction, as in
GATE. However, the reasoning of those cases, which relied upon the general
power of the provinces to regulate business enterprises, seemed to suggest
that communications media enjoyed no special status with regard to provin-
cial regulation. In constitutional terms, at least, freedom of expression seemed
to count for little; the province could regulate the content of a company's
advertisements just as it could regulate the quality of its cereal. These cases
seemed to have narrowly confined the scope of earlier cases, such as Saumur
v. City of Quebec54 and Switzman v. Elbling,55 which had held that freedom
of expression was a matter of constitutional significance.
Even more striking is the contrast between the Court's approach to
freedom of expression in the GATE case and the Dupond case.58 In Dupond,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Montreal by-law that banned all
parades and demonstrations within the city for a period of 30 days. It held
that this by-law came within provincial powers over matters of a local nature
and the prevention of crime. The Court did not seem to have assigned any
special significance to the fact that these powers had been exercised so as to
limit freedom of expression. The judgment stated that English law does not
recognize a right to use the public streets for an assembly to express one's
views, and the right seemed to have played no part in the Court's considera-
tion of the division of powers between the federal and provincial govern-
ments. The Court's approach might be explained on the basis of Beetz J.'s
50 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 662, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
5' [1978] 2 S.C.R. 211, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 314.
52 Id. at 220 (S.C.R.), 319 (D.L.R.).
53 Id. at 222 (S.C.R.), 320 (D.L.R.).
54 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 641.
55 [1957] S.C.R. 285, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 337.
56 A.G. Can. v. Montreal, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 420, [hereinafter
Dupond].
1979]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
statement that parades and demonstrations are not speech at all,67 but that
conclusion itself illustrates the Court's unwillingness in Dupond to give broad
ambit to freedom of expression.
It is especially difficult to reconcile the Court's approach to the "implied
bill of rights" in the two cases. That theory declares that the democratic sys-
tem that we inherited necessarily implies a freedom of expression on the part
of all subjects that cannot be suppressed by provincial legislatures or perhaps
even by Parliament. The theory was first developed in obiter by Duff C.J.C.
and Cannon J. in the Alberta Press case.68 It was further developed in minor-
ity judgments in the Saumur and Switzman cases,59 but it has never been
adopted by a majority of the Court and seemed to owe its survival to the
careful attention of constitutional law teachers. It appeared that the majority
judgment in Dupond had effected a decisive end to this theory. In outline
form, Mr. Justice Beetz said:
1. None of the freedoms referred to is so enshrined in the Constitution as to be
above the reach of competent legislation.
2. None of those freedoms is a single matter coming within exclusive federal or
provincial competence. Each of them is an aggregate of several matters which,
depending on the aspect, come within federal or provincial competence 00
In the GATE case, Mr. Justice Martland cited the Alberta Press case
as demonstrating the importance Canadian law accords to freedom of speech. 0'
That view can be reconciled with Dupond on the basis that freedom of speech
might be of significance in interpreting statutes even if it were of no conse-
quence to constitutional issues. But Martland J. went on to hint that Alberta
Press may still be valid as constitutional law, saying:
A newspaper supporting certain political views does not have to publish an adver-
tisement advancing contrary views. In fact, the judgments of Duff C.J. and Davis and
Cannon JJ. in the Alberta Press case, previously mentioned, suggest that provin-
cial legislation to compel such publication may be unconstitutional. 2
In light of McNeil, Kellogg's and Dupond, none of which were cited, it is
hard to accept this obiter. Whether valid or not, however, it makes it difficult
to distinguish GATE from Dupond on the ground that one concerned a
constitutional challenge and the other did not, for that distinction does not
seem to have played an important part in the thinking of the majority in
GATE.
Cherneskey v. Armadale Publishers Ltd. 3 also suggests that the distinc-
tion between constitutional and non-constitutional cases does not explain the
Court's change of emphasis. In Cherneskey a Saskatchewan Alderman sued
a newspaper for publishing defamatory statements contained in a letter to the
editor. In defence, the newspaper pleaded that the statements were fair com-
57 Id. at 797 (S.C.R.), 439 (D.L.R.).
58 Supra note 43.
59 Supra notes 54 and 55.
6 Supra note 56, at 796-97 (S.C.R.), 439 (D.L.R.).
61 Supra note 5, at 127 (N.R.), 125 (W.W.R.).
62 Id.
03 (1978), 90 D.L.R. (3d) 321, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 618 (S.C.C.).
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ment on a matter of public interest. The Court had to determine the nature
of the subjective mental state that would defeat the defence of fair comment.
But at the heart of the dispute was the question as to who had the burden
of proof on the issue, since the authors of the letter were unavailable and
there was no evidence at all as to their subjective mental state.
In Cherneskey, the Court was not dealing with the B.N.A. Act or even
with the wording of an ordinary statute. Moreover, there was no Canadian
authority on point. The English cases contained language that could be used
to support either result, but could readily be construed as supporting the
position of the newspaper. In short, the Court had a clear opportunity to opt
for freedom of expression, unfettered by statute or contrary judicial prece-
dent. The majority chose not to do so. It held that a newspaper has the bur-
den of proving that comment in letters to the editor represents either the
honest opinion of the letter writer or of the newspaper. The decision specifi-
cally said that newspapers enjoy no special status in the law of defamation. 64
The effect on free speech was not simply overlooked but was consciously
subordinated to another interest, for Dickson J., in a strongly worded dissent,
argued cogently that the result would discourage the publication of letters
expressing opinions contrary to those of the newspaper and would limit free
discussion of public issues. 5
The cases that I have cited deal with a wide variety of facts and legal
issues and all can be distinguished from the GATE case on one ground or
another. Freedom of speech must always be balanced against other social
interests, and it is possible that the Court found the competing interests par-
ticularly strong in those cases. However, when they are read together, one
does not have the feeling that the Court reluctantly subordinated an important
right in favour of other interests of paramount importance. Instead, the Court
took pains to emphasize that newspapers and movie theatres are ordinary
businesses, and marchers are in the same category as pedestrians and motor-
ists. Freedom of speech was subordinated to a variety of interests that have
nothing in common, and it seems more likely that the Court assigned a rela-
tively low priority to that freedom than that it treated the other disparate
interests as all being particularly grave.
Earlier cases in which the Court had acted to protect freedom of expres-
sion generally involved risks to that freedom that were substantially more
serious than any risk created by the Human Rights Code. Most of them in-
volved a restriction on the power to criticize the government or to present a
political view in opposition to the government. For example, the statute con-
sidered in Alberta Press"° came into effect upon criticism of the social credit
program, Boucher v. The King67 considered a pamphlet highly critical of the
64 Id. at 337 (D.L.R.), 632 (W.W.R.).
Or Id. at 343-45 (D.L.R.), 641-43 (W.W.R.).
66 Supra note 43. In addition, the remedy for a violation of the statute included a
ban on publication until further order or prohibition of material written by a specified
person or emanating from a specified source. These remedies could be imposed by order
of the Lieutenant Governor upon recommendation of the Chairman of the Board estab-
lished by statute. S.A. 1937 (3d sess.) Bill 9, s. 6.
67 [1951] S.C.R. 265, [1950] 1 D.L.R. 657.
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Qu6bec government, and Switzman68 considered a law restricting the distribu-
tion of material supporting communism. Limits on political criticism can be
misused by a government to perpetuate itself and there is a special danger
that such laws will not be enforced impartially. The Alberta statute was par-
ticularly severe, for it required that newspapers publish, without compensa-
tion, a reply by the government and thus created a financial penalty for
publishing such criticism. Saumur0 9 considered a provision that in effect gave
the chief of police unfettered discretion to prohibit the distribution of material
on the streets. The material had to be submitted to the police in advance,
and the power was one of prior restraint on speech.70
The GATE case did not involve any of these factors. The Human Rights
Code does not in any way restrict the power of the newspaper to criticize the
government. Indeed, it protects the right of advertisers to publish such criti-
cism. There is no direct or indirect interference with the news columns or
editorial views of the newspaper. The obligation to publish an advertisement
is determined by the scope of the advertising service that the newspaper offers
rather than by the publication of an editorial opinion as in Alberta Press.
The law specifies only that the advertisement be published at the normal rate
set by the newspaper. It creates no financial detriment.
Two factors might be thought to point to a restriction on free speech,
but I do not believe that they are comparable to the restrictions considered
in earlier cases. First, the Human Rights Code imposes an affirmative legal
obligation rather than a prohibition. The law has tended to disfavour affirma-
tive obligations, and though that attitude seems to be changing somewhat, 1
it may have influenced the Court. Requiring a person to assist in publishing
material that he or she finds offensive can cause emotional distress, even if
it is done for pay in the ordinary course of business. That factor alone, how-
ever, does not constitute an undue restriction on freedom of speech if applied
to publishers. The law often condones similar obligations. Radio and televi-
sion stations are required to air political advertisements during an election.
72
Newspaper employees, book store clerks and secretaries are often obligated
by contract to compose, reproduce or deliver material that they find offensive
if they choose to take part in those kinds of business activity. The law would
award damages if a printing company that had contracted to publish a
periodical refused to reproduce material with which it disagreed. It does not
seem to be a great jump to impose a similar obligation on the basis that a
68 Supra note 55.
69 Supra note 54.
70 The McKay case, supra note 47, might be viewed as an exception. The prohibi-
tion was of lawn signs and concerned the format of the presentation rather than the
content of the signs. The rule was prospective, and the government had no stake in
the outcome. It seems that the Court was persuaded not by the severity of the restriction
but by the importance of the subject matter-federal elections.
71 See, e.g., Horsley v. MacLaren, [1972] S.C.R. 441, 22 D.L.R. (3d) 545; and
Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, [1974] S.C.R. 1189, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530.
72 Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st supp.), c. 14, s. 99.1, as am. by S.C.
1974, c. 51, s. 14, S.C. 1977, c. 31, s. 58.
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mass circulation newspaper has chosen to offer an advertising service to the
public.73
Any emotional distress caused by requiring that material be published
must be discounted by the comparable distress incurred by people who will
be unable to publish views that are important to them unless their right to do
so is protected by law. We must choose between competing claims to freedom
of expression, and in any particular case the emotional distress of either party
may be more severe. If, for example, a religious group submitted a paid
announcement of services to a publisher of another faith, we cannot presume
that the distress caused by requiring publication would outweigh that caused
by a refusal to publish. In short, it is not clear whether, on balance, imposing
this affirmative obligation restricts or expands freedom of expression.
Though it was not considered by the Supreme Court majority, one other
aspect of the Human Rights Code might cause concern. In using the words
"reasonable cause," the legislature seems to have assigned considerable dis-
cretion to human rights tribunals to elaborate gradually upon the exact scope
of the statute. Discretion can be abused, and it is worth considering whether
there is a risk that the Human Rights Code could be misapplied so as to
restrict free speech unduly.
It would be a mistake to ignore that risk, but it does not follow that
publishers should be immunized from the Code. Instead, the Court could
have placed limitations on the words "reasonable cause" that would have mini-
mized the potential conflict with freedom of expression. Dickson J.'s dissent-
ing judgment makes a start in that direction by emphasizing the immunity of
news and editorial columns from regulation and by specifying that reasonable
cause should be judged by an objective test.74 The Court could also have
imposed other limitations. For example, it might have specified that a news-
paper could refuse an advertisement that was so large that it would require
news columns to be restricted, or it could have acknowledged the right of the
paper to edit offensive language in a non-discriminatory manner. As so
limited, the Code would provide a circumscribed right of access to advertis-
ing space that would take account of the claims of both the public and the
newspaper to freedom of expression.
It seems, therefore, that the strong emphasis in GATE on the impor-
tance of freedom of expression is a departure from other recent cases and
may even go beyond cases such as Alberta Press, Saumur and Switzman.
The change in approach is exemplified by the Court's citation of the federal
Bill of Rights and its reliance on American authority. The Court has seldom
given the Canadian Bill of Rights operative effect even as applied to federal
legislation;75 in GATE it was cited in interpreting a provincial statute. In
addition, the Court had taken pains in several earlier cases to emphasize
distinctions between the American and Canadian constitutional systems in
7 3 However, a Board of Inquiry might sensibly take the affirmative nature of the
requirement into account in refusing to grant an order of specific performance.
74 GATE, supra note 5, at 141, 148-49 (N.R.), 139, 145-46 (W.W.R.).
75 S.C. 1960, c. 44. See Tarnopolsky, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties (1976),
14 Alta. L. Rev. 58 at 81-96.
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refusing to follow United States decisions concerning fundamental rights. 70
In GATE, the Court relied heavily on a decision of the United States Supreme
Court discussing freedom of the press.
The American approach to regulation of the media is instructive, but it
is more helpful in defining the problem than in providing a solution. In
particular, the American cases are helpful in separating out the various claims
that are lumped together in the handy phrase "freedom of speech." The cases
have distinguished between freedom of speech and freedom of the press, a
distinction that has found little favour in Canadian cases.77 Earlier United
States cases also distinguished between ordinary speech and "commercial
speech" such as advertising, though this distinction is now becoming less
important. 78 But most important in the context of the GATE case, the Ameri-
can cases have distinguished between freedom from regulation of speech and
a right of access to the media to enable members of the public to disseminate
their views.79 Obviously, the freedom from regulation and the right of access
frequently come in conflict. The United States Supreme Court's resolution
of this conflict is at best an uneasy compromise and perhaps an indefensible
one.
In GATE the Supreme Court of Canada relied upon the Tornillo case,
80
which considered the constitutionality of a Florida statute providing that if a
newspaper published criticism of a political candidate, "such newspaper shall
... publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a
place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply. .. "
The United States Supreme Court first discussed in considerable detail the
arguments in favour of a right of access. In particular, the Court cited the
concentration of ownership of newspapers and noted that "the same eco-
nomic factors which have caused the disappearance of vast numbers of
metropolitan newspapers, have made entry into the marketplace of ideas
served by the print media almost impossible."'s The Court did not contest
the validity of these points, but said that governmental action to provide a
mandatory right of access would violate the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Noting that the reply must be printed free of charge, the
challenged statute was said in effect to exact a penalty for criticism of politi-
cal candidates. The Court continued:
Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that published news
or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute, editors
might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under
the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be
71 See, e.g., A.G. Can. v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349 at 1365, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481
at 494; and Smythe v. The Queen, [1971] S.C.R. 680 at 686, 19 D.L.R. (3d) 480 at 485.
77 But see CKOY Ltd. v. The Queen, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 2 at 14-15, 90 D.L.R. (3d)
1 at 11-12. The Court states that the press "has no more freedom of expression than the
ordinary citizen." But it goes on to distinguish between freedom of the press and free-
dom of speech.
78 GATE, supra note 5, at 145-46 (N.R.), 142-43 (W.W.R.) (dissenting).
79 See Schmidt, Freedom of the Press vs. Public Access (New York: Praeger, 1976)
at 119-218.
80 Supra note 44.
81 Id. at 251 (U.S.), 2836 (S. Ct.).
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blunted or reduced. Government-enforced right of access inescapably "dampens
the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. .... 82
The Court then held that the statute would violate the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution even without these penalties. The portion
of the judgment quoted by the Supreme Court of Canada said:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and
advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public
issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of
editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental
regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amend-
ment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.93
Tornillo represents a high point in the United States Supreme Court's
recognition of the immunity of the press from regulation. However, the Court
recognized even in Tornillo that this immunity was not absolute and cited
with approval a case upholding a statute prohibiting employment advertise-
ments that express a preference for males or females.84 Other cases have
restricted that immunity so as to give the public a right of access to the
media. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion,15 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a regulation providing for a
right of reply by a person or group criticized in a broadcast on the ground
that airwaves are limited and a licence to use this limited resource carries a
concomitant obligation to provide access to other points of view. The Court
found that such regulations "enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of
speech and press protected by the First Amendment .... 86a It has been
pointed out that the Court's emphasis on the limited number of broadcast
frequencies may be misplaced and that an even stronger argument can be
made for a right of access to newspaper space. In fact there are more broad-
casting stations than daily newspapers in the United States, just as there are
in Canada.87 The economic constraints seem to be more effective than the
technological ones.
The conflict between press immunity and a right of access caused par-
ticular difficulty in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee.a8 The Court upheld the right of the broadcaster to refuse an ad-
vertisement expressing a group's views on the Viet Nam war. A majority
rejected the view of the two dissenting judges that the broadcaster had itself
violated the First Amendment in refusing the advertisement. The majority
also ruled that the Federal Communications Commission had properly inter-
82 Id. at 257 (U.S.), 2839 (S. Ct.).
83Id. at 258 (U.S.), 2840 (S. Ct.).
84 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 93 S. Ct. 2553
(1973).
85 395 U.S. 367, 89 S. Ct. 1794 (1969).
86 Id. at 375 (U.S.), 1798-99 (S. Ct.).
87 Powe, "Or of the [Broadcast] Press," [1976] 55 Tex. L. Rev. 39 at 56-57; Statis-
tics Canada, Canada Yearbook 1978-79 (Ottawa: n. pub., 1978) at 676-80 (120 daily
newspapers versus 614 radio and television stations, 402 of which are private).
88 412 U.S. 94, 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973).
1979]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
preted its powers in refusing to order that the advertisement be accepted.
However, the majority was careful to note that the refusal of the advertise-
ment must be considered in conjunction with the broadcaster's statutory
obligation under the "fairness doctrine" to present opposing points of view
in its regular programming. Moreover, three of the justices took pains to note
that the Commission was examining the possibility of providing some form of
right of access, and added:
mhe history of the Communications Act and the activities of the Commission
over a period of 40 years reflect a continuing search for means to achieve reason-
able regulation compatible with the First Amendment rights of the public and the
licencees. The Commission's pending hearings are but one step in this continuing
process. At the very least, courts should not freeze this necessarily dynamic pro-
cess into a constitutional holding.89
Thus, two members of the Court found that a right of access could be derived
from the Constitution itself even in the absence of any statute. Three other
judges rejected this view but took care to avoid any suggestion that a statute
providing for such a right would be unconstitutional.90
Read in the context of these other cases, Tornilo states a principle
applicable only within a circumscribed area. The United States Supreme
Court has struck a precarious balance between the freedom of the media from
governmental intrusion and the right of others to make their views known to
the general public. The decisions are fairly narrow legal rulings applied to
specific situations. Therefore, American law does not provide any easy answer
to the issues raised in the GATE case, even ignoring any differences in Amer-
ican and Canadian constitutional language. In particular, Tornillo is of little
help in considering the importance of the fact that the Human Rights Code
applies only to advertising and not to news or editorial columns, a distinction
stressed by Dickson J. in upholding the Code.91 Subsequent lower court judg-
ments in the United States have split as to the applicability of Tornillo to
advertising.
92
To summarize, neither the Canadian nor the American cases formulate
a test by which the GATE case can be easily judged. The Court's approach
to freedom of speech in GATE seems different from that of other recent
cases, but the judgment does not identify the reason for that change. The
American cases make a useful distinction between freedom from regulation
and a right of access, but the boundary between the two is left uncertain and,
judged by American law, the facts of GATE fall within the area still in
dispute.
In GATE the Court placed an elaborate gloss on the words "service
customarily available to the public" that is inexplicable by any literal reading
of the statute. As I have noted, the Court relied on the rule that statutes
should be construed restrictively if they infringe upon a fundamental right. If,
89 Id. at 132 (U.S.), 2101 (S. Ct.).
90 Id. at 170-204 (U.S.), 2120-38 (S. Ct.) (dissenting).
91 GATE, supra note 5, at 148-49 (N.R.), 145-46 (W.W.R.).
92 Compare Fitzgerald v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of America, 383 F. Supp. 162 (D. Ct.
D. N.J. 1974) at 166 with Gore Newspapers Co. v. .Shevin, 397 F. Supp. 1253 (D. Ct.
S.D. Fla. 1975) at 1257.
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as I have suggested, the GATE case presented the Court with competing
claims to freedom of expression, one of which was enhanced by the Code,
that rule of construction does not seem appropriate. The obvious conclusion
is that the majority did not see public right of access as a fundamental right
comparable to the newspaper's claim to freedom of the press. Their failure
to do so was not inadvertent, for Dickson J.'s dissenting judgment discussed
that approach.
I wish to outline two alternative justifications for freedom of expression
and to examine the hypothesis that the Court's reasoning reveals a shift from
the justification previously emphasized in Canadian cases to a different one
that is inconsistent with recognition of a right of access.
The first justification starts from the proposition that we have a demo-
cratic system of government that gives citizens the right to participate in the
governmental process. If this system is to result in sound decisions, it is neces-
sary that all citizens have access to the relevant information, and there must
be free discussion of all sides of public issues so that competing views can
be tested against one another in the "marketplace of ideas." The reader is
undoubtedly familiar with this position, and I will not develop it in detail.
The point I wish to emphasize is that this approach justifies freedom of
speech on the basis of the good of society rather than any individual interest.
Freedom of speech must be maintained because the system will not work
properly without it.
Proponents of strict obscenity laws assert that the material that they
want to ban is totally unrelated to any discussion of governmental affairs,
and they are usually right. One can imagine the reaction of Queen Victoria
and her ministers if they had been told that the B.N.A. Act protected a book
such as Lady Chatterley's Lover,93 much less magazines composed entirely of
nude pictures and lurid sexual fantasy. Civil libertarians often defend the
right to publish such material on the ground that any restriction on speech
constitutes a precedent that can be gradually extended to suppress political
criticism. That argument is sometimes valid, as in the case of Lawrence's
social criticism, but it is often strained beyond credibility. Though there is no
definitive line between sexual material and the discussion of public affairs,
we tolerate much finer distinctions in other areas of the law even when funda-
mental rights are at stake.
94
Often, non-political forms of speech can be defended more persuasively
in terms of a second justification. This approach is not based upon the good
of society but is a claim of individuals and derives from the broader claim
that the individual has the right to be free from governmental restriction un-
less his or her conduct is unduly harmful to other individuals. Historically,
this justification is tied to theories of natural law and it postulates that the
source of individual rights is outside the political system."
23 Lawrence, Lady Chatterley's Lover (New York: Grove Press, 1962); see R. v.
Brodie, [1962] S.C.R. 681, 32 D.L.R. (2d) 507, 132 C.C.C. 161.
94 Our elaborate set of rules concerning the admissibility of statements made to
police provides an example.
95 Lloyd, The Idea of Law (London: Penguin, 1972) at 83-85.
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Canadian authority has defended freedom of speech almost entirely in
terms of the first justification. The approach is most fully developed in the
discussions of the implied bill of rights and derives naturally from our con-
stitutional language. The cases have relied primarily on the preamble to the
B.N.A. Act which provides that Canada shall have a constitution "similar in
principle to that of the United Kingdom."9 6 The decisions have reasoned that
this language refers to the democratic tradition of Great Britain and have
asserted that freedom of speech is essential to that system of government.
The source of the right is firmly grounded within the governmental system
that we inherited.
The second justification is given prominence in American political his-
tory. The framers of the United States Constitution were influenced by the
theory that the source of governmental power is in the voluntary delegation
by the members of society of the pre-existing rights that they naturally pos-
sessed as individuals. 97 The United States Declaration of Independence states
that all people "are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights
.... That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... ."8 Roscoe
Pound noted that "Jefferson claimed the rights of Americans by the universal
title of humanity when the breach with England made it awkward to claim
them as Englishmen."9 This view has been incorporated into American
constitutional law.100
The two justifications for freedom of speech usually reinforce one an-
other. The discussion of public affairs can be defended either on the basis
that it promotes good government or that there is no reason to restrict the
individual's right to speak. But the two approaches lead in quite different
directions when the "right of access" aspect of freedom of expression is at
issue. The inconsistency between them in that context is clearly revealed in
the majority judgment in Tornillo. The Court seemed to concede that the
concentration of power in the publishing industry has imperilled the "market-
place of ideas" and that the purported object of the statute under challenge
was to ensure that the public had access to all sides of an issue.101 The Court
continued:
However much validity may be found in these arguments, at each point the im-
plementation of a remedy such as an enforceable right of access necessarily calls
for some mechanism, either governmental or consensual. If it is governmental
coercion, this at once brings about a confrontation with the express provisions
of the First Amendment .... 102
96 Alberta Press, supra note 43, at 132-35, 145-46 (S.C.R.), 107-09, 119-20 (D.L.R.);
Saumur, supra note 54, at 330-31 (S.C.R.), 671-72 (D.L.R.); Switzman, supra note 55,
at 306-07, 326-28 (S.C.R.), 357-59, 369-71 (D.L.R.).
97 Lloyd, supra note 95, at 84.
98 The Declaration of Independence-1776, 1 U.S.C. at xxvii (1964).
99 Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty (New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1960) at 75.
300 Sutherland, Constitutionalism in America (New York: Blaisdell Pub. Co., 1965)
at 2-4; see Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977)
at 191-92.
101 Supra note 44, at 248, 251 (U.S.), 2835-36 (S. Ct.).
102 Id. at 254 (U.S.), 2838 (S. Ct.).
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This passage, together with that quoted earlier, 03 seems clearly to subordi-
nate the right of access to the right of the individual to be free from govern-
mental intrusion, just as the Court subordinated the latter right to the former
in the Red Lion case.
104
In GATE, the majority of the Supreme Court cited only two cases,
Tornillo and Alberta Press.'5 In terms of the distinction that I have drawn,
these cases reflect quite different values. Alberta Press justified freedom of
speech in terms of the need for free discussion in a democracy; Duff C.J.C.
and Cannon J. found that the statute discouraged such discussion. In Tornillo,
the United States Supreme Court made a similar finding, but went on to say
that the statute would be unconstitutional even if it had the effect of pro-
moting rather than restricting free discussion, and it was this latter line of
reasoning upon which the majority in GATE relied. Therefore, the Supreme
Court of Canada seems, consciously or unconsciously, to have adopted a
justification for freedom of speech quite different from that outlined in earlier
Canadian cases and in some circumstances inconsistent with the traditional
Canadian rationale. The change in approach is most apparent in a passage
in which Martland J. states:
The law has recognized the freedom of the press to propagate its views and ideas
on any issue and to select the material which it chooses to publish. As a corollary
to that a newspaper also has the right to refuse to publish material which runs
contrary to the views which it expresses .... A newspaper supporting certain
political views does not have to publish an advertisement advancing contrary
views.' 06
The right to suppress political views seems clearly inconsistent with any jus-
tification based upon the needs of our democratic system.
The willingness to examine American cases concerning fundamental
rights is welcome, not because we should be moving toward an American
approach to fundamental rights, but simply because the American juris-
prudence is extensive and we should not ignore the lessons, both positive and
negative, that it provides. Mr. Justice Dickson's approach in his dissenting
judgment is also noteworthy in this regard. He carefully examines the Ameri-
can approach, evaluates its positive and negative features, and considers
whether it fits into the Canadian system. Although he ultimately rejects the
American approach, his judgment is far more instructive for having gone
through this process.
103 See text following note 83, supra.
'o4 Supra note 85.
'o5 Supra notes 44 and 43, respectively.
106 GATE, supra note 2, at 127 (N.R.), 125 (W.W.R.). Martland J. also notes
that a newspaper published by a religious group would not have to publish an advertise-
ment advocating atheism. Arguments in favour of a right of access stress the concentra-
tion of control of the mass media and the barriers to entry into that industry. Those
justifications do not apply to small independent publications. Also, if the primary pur-
pose of a publication is dissemination of the views of a religious or political group rather
than profit, the claim to immunity seems particularly strong. Canadian human rights
statutes provide a limited exemption to such organizations (see Human Rights Code of
British Columbia, S.B.C. 1973 (2d sess.), c. 119, s. 22), and perhaps such provisions
should be clarified. But it is a mistake to equate the claims of such publications with
those of mass circulation newspapers.
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The Court's reliance on the right of free speech is also a welcome shift
from recent cases that seemed to be steadily eroding that right. I have tried
to show that the Court actually was faced with two competing claims to free-
dom of expression and that the opposite result could be defended with equal
plausibility in terms of that right. Nevertheless, the Court's willingness to
recognize any aspect of the right is a hopeful sign.
IV. BALANCING RIGHTS
The claims of each of the parties were based upon a fundamental right.
The position of the Gay Alliance and the B.C. Human Rights Commission
reflected the egalitarian rights embodied in the Human Rights Code. The
Vancouver Sun's argument was founded on freedom of the press.
When, as here, two fundamental rights are in conflict, it is often said
that they must be balanced against one another. It makes little sense to try to
determine whether the Court assigned the "correct" weight to each of the
competing rights, for they cannot be measured by any absolute standard. We
can only speculate about the result if one of the rights is pitted against some
other interest or if the same rights come into conflict in some other context.
But any assessment of the importance that will be accorded the case as prece-
dent requires precisely such speculation.
The result in GATE cannot be explained in terms of any binding rule of
law. Certainly the Court was bound by no judicial precedent. The majority
judgment cited only two cases, one of which was American. The other,
Alberta Press,0 7 was easily distinguishable and had recently been sharply
restricted if not overruled. The Court had to read a good deal into the words
"service ... customarily available to the public" and was not bound by the
statutory wording. It is also hard to believe that the result was influenced by
reaction to the innocuous wording of the advertisement or that the Court was
concerned about the consequences of including this two-line advertisement
in the expansive classified advertising columns of the Vancouver Sun, which
admitted that it published larger and far more explicit advertisements con-
cerning homosexuality and had also published news stories on this subject.10 8
It seems clear, then, that the decision was not based on the particular facts
of the case and that the Court was forced to make a fundamental value judg-
ment about the relative importance of the competing rights. The three obvious
explanations for its change of direction are: 1) that it now assigns greater
importance to freedom of speech than it has in the recent past; 2) that it
assigns low importance to egalitarian rights and the protection of minorities;
or 3) that there is an unwillingness to extend protection to homosexuals.
I will not try to assess the likelihood of the third explanation, simply
because there is almost nothing upon which to base a judgment about the
Court's attitude toward homosexuality. The Court has occasionally con-
sidered sex offences involving homosexual activity, 10 9 but those cases reveal
107 Supra note 43.
108 GATE, supra note 2, at 16-17.
109 See, e.g., Guay v. The Queen, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 18, 89 D.L.R. (3d) 532, 42
C.C.C. (2d) 536.
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little, if anything, about the Court's attitude toward homosexuality outside
of the criminal context."" It may be of some significance, however, that the
subject of homosexuality has seldom come before the appellate courts except
in a criminal context, and that fact may have coloured the attitude of the
judiciary. 1"
There is some support in the majority judgment for the first explanation.
Martland J. spoke of the importance of freedom of the press, and there is no
language critical of the purposes of anti-discrimination statutes or their ex-
tension to protect homosexuals. Optimistically, then, the Court adopted a
strained and restrictive interpretation of the statute only because of a new
commitment to freedom of speech. On the other hand, the majority did not
discuss the purposes of the legislation at all; there is nothing in the judgment
recognizing that equality of treatment may also be an important interest de-
serving judicial recognition. Also, the Court did not reinterpret the recent
judgments placing limitations on freedom of speech; it simply ignored those
cases. For example, the Court cited the judgments in the Alberta Press"2
case that gave rise to the implied bill of rights theory, but it did not explain
the passages in the Dupond"3 case that had seemed to reject that theory. I
would be more confident that the majority judgment represented a renewed
commitment to freedom of speech if the Court had been more forthright
about its change in approach.
That interpretation also does not take account of the way in which the
Court divided. The accompanying chart shows the division of the Court in
recent freedom of speech cases. Each of the judges is shown as voting for or
against the result that protected freedom of speech. With the exception of
Spence J., who has consistently favoured freedom of speech (and excluding
Pratte and Estey JJ. who each sat on only one other case), it would have
been more logical on the basis of the earlier cases to predict just the opposite
division. Of course, the chart is oversimplified. Different cases involved differ-
ent aspects of freedom of speech, and all of the cases raised other issues as
well. A judge who assigns great importance to free speech may, in a particu-
lar case, have favoured some restriction on that right because he believed that
some other interest was of paramount importance. Nevertheless, I believe that
a comparison of the cases reveals that four of the six judges in the majority
departed significantly from their general approach in earlier cases by stressing
the overriding importance of freedom of speech in the GATE case. The chart
probably overstates the point, but I believe that the conclusion is sound.
The optimistic view is that this inconsistency reflects a change of attitude
toward freedom of speech, but it could also be taken to suggest that some
other value underlies the judgment.
110 See Boyle, Custody, Adoption and the Homosexual Parent (1976), 23 R.F.L.
129, generally and at 142 for a discussion of homosexuality in the context of family law
and a compilation of articles referring to the psychological normality of homosexuals.
111 The issue of homosexuality would normally arise in civil cases concerning family
law. It has only arisen in a handful of reported family law cases in the last decade. Cf.
Boyle, id. at 131; see Re Bd. of Gov., supra note 7, for a case not involving family law.
112 Supra note 43.
113 Supra note 56.
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH 14
DIVISION OF COURT
Kellogg's McNeil Dupond Chemeskey GATE
Majority
Martland J. S S S S F
Ritchie J. S S S S F
Spence J. F F F F F
Pigeon J. S S S S F
Beetz J. S S S S F
Pratte J. - - - S F
Dissenting
Laskin C.J. F F F S S
Dickson J. F F S F S
Estey J. - - - F S
F = Result favouring freedom of speech
S = Result subordinates freedom of speech to another interest
Unfortunately, the theory that the Court assigns relatively low impor-
tance to the rights of minorities accords more closely with previous cases.
The Supreme Court in Christie v. York Corporation"r5 narrowly construed an
anti-discrimination provision in the Qudbec Licence Act so as not to apply
to the denial by a tavern owner of service to a "coloured person." The Court
found that the refusal was not contrary to good morals or public order and
said that consideration must start from the principle of freedom of commerce.
114 The cases given in the chart are Dupond, id.; Kellogg's, supra note 51; McNeil,
supra note 50; and Cherneskey, supra note 63. I have omitted one other recent case because
it contained conflicting indications of the attitude of the various judges toward freedom
of speech. The CKOY case, supra note 77, concerned the validity of a regulation passed
under the Broadcasting Act that prohibits the broadcasting of a telephone interview or
conversation unless the person consented or telephoned for that purpose. The station
alleged, inter alia, that the regulation violated s. 2(f) of the Canadian Bill of Rights
guaranteeing -freedom of the press. Spence, Ritchie, Pigeon, Dickson, Beetz and Pratte
JJ. held that the regulation was authorized by the statute and did not violate the Bill of
Rights. Martland J., joined by Laskin C.J.C. and Estey J., dissented on the ground that
the regulation was not authorized by the statute and constituted a form of censorship.
They did not discuss the Bill of Rights. It was the dissenting judges who explicitly relied
upon the station's right to free speech. However, the majority found that the challenged
regulation protected the freedom of speech of the person telephoning the station, Thus
the two judgments seem each to uphold one aspect of freedom of speech and to refuse
to recognize a competing aspect of that right. It is noteworthy that the majority judg-
ment in CKOY recognized that the case raised competing claims to freedom of expres-
sion whereas 5 of the 6 judges who did so failed to make a comparable distinction in
the GATE case.
The cases that I have cited all were decided within the last two years. If the chart
were extended back five years it would also include Provincial News Co. v. The Queen,
[1976] S.C.R. 89, 52 D.L.R. (3d) 222, 20 C.C.C. (2d) 385, in which a majority quashed
the appeal of the news company from the order of forfeiture of an allegedly obscene
magazine. Martland, Judson and Dickson JJ. were in the majority; Laskin C.j.c. and
Spence J. dissented.
115 [1940] S.C.R. 139, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 81.
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The Christie case was decided in 1940, but Bell v. Ontario Human
Rights Commission"16 can be read as reflecting a similar approach less baldly
stated. Bell concerned the denial of housing on the ground of race. At the
time, The Ontario Human Rights Code prohibited discrimination only with
respect to a "self-contained dwelling unit." The Board of Inquiry denied a
preliminary motion that the Code was inapplicable because the space was not
self-contained, finding that this issue should be determined at the hearing.
The Supreme Court of Canada found that the space was not self-contained
and granted a writ of prohibition preventing the Board from hearing the com-
plaint. Not only did the Court adopt a narrow construction of the statute, but
it denied the Board the opportunity to consider the issue by characterizing
it as jurisdictional. The case seems to reflect the attitude that human rights
legislation should be strictly construed and human rights tribunals should be
strictly supervised. It is possible that both Bell and GATE are best explained
on the basis that the Court continues to assign more importance to the right
of freedom of commerce than to egalitarian rights.
The Court has also narrowly interpreted section 1(b) of the Cana-
dian Bill of Rights, which guarantees equality before the law."17 It has held
that section 1 (b) did not create or expand any right but only confirmed
existing rights."18 Passages from the Bliss case"19 come close to suggesting
that the right of equality must be subordinated to any other "valid legislative
purpose."
The Court has narrowly interpreted other portions of the Bill of Rights
as well as section 1 (b),120 and it is unclear whether its approach in the
equality cases reflects uneasiness with the implications of that particular right
or with the concept of a bill of rights. Bell is the only other case in which the
Court has considered a modem human rights statute, and it may be a mistake
to see a pattern on the basis of only two cases. Nevertheless, the Court's
record in dealing with minority rights is cause for uneasiness. Human rights
statutes were enacted in part in response to the failure of the judiciary to apply
common law principles or penal provisions in a way that effectively protected
minorities from discrimination. 12' If future cases were to interpret human rights
statutes in a very restrictive fashion, minorities would undoubtedly perceive
the result as demonstrating the indifference of the judiciary to their rights,
and perhaps as reflecting upon the impartiality of the judicial process.
In GATE, the Court assigned greater importance to freedom of the press
than it has in any case since Alberta Press. I hope that it will continue to do
so in future cases. Freedom of the press was protected in GATE at consider-
able cost in terms of competing rights, and there should be a suitable return
on that jurisprudential investment.
116 [1971] S.C.R. 756, 18 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
117 See A.G. Can. v. Lavell, supra note 76; and Bliss v. A.G. Can., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183,
92 D.L.R. (3d) 417.
118 Id.
11o ld. at 193-94 (S.C.R.), 424-25 (D.L.R.).
2
2o See, e.g., Hogan v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574, 48 D.L.R. (3d) 427; and
Mitchell v. The Queen, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 570, 61 D.L.R. (3d) 67.
121 See Tarnopolsky, supra note 41, at 569-71.
1979]
